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NOTES
ulterior reasons for denying passports. The courts must scrupulously guard
against such abuse.42 Restriction on movement is one of the primary
methods employed by totalitarian states for the prevention of the ex-
change of ideas. Because it is inconsistent with the principles of a demo-
cratic society, we should be certain that an individual will not be con-
fined to the United States merely because he might voice opinions con-
trary to those endorsed by the State Department. Free speech and free-
dom of belief are fundamental to a free nation. The necessity for the
free exchange of ideas and impressions -is essential today to facilitate
eventual world peace.
NOrAN S. JEAVONS
The Legislature Revisits the Ohio Assignment
of Accounts Receivable Law
INTRODUCnON
While this era has been categorized as the Atomic Age, it may well
be referred to by future economists as the Age of Credit. Credit, in all
its ramifications, presents us with an all-pervading problem in our econ-
omy today. One of the methods of financing which has become increas-
ingly important in the last two decades has been the assignment of ac-
counts receivable. Accounts receivable financing has been defined as;
... a continuing arrangement through which a financing agency makes
funds available to a business concern by purchasing its invoices or accounts
receivable over a period of time, or by making advances or loans, taking
one or a series of assignments of accounts as primary collateral security.'
Basically, the assignment of accounts receivable has flourished because
it supplies the businessman with cash in exchange for an asset which has
become immobile -in the form of accounts receivable.2 "It is the substitu-
tion of a dynamic for a static asset. '3 As opposed to such forms of credit
as installment purchases or chattel mortgages, the assignment of accounts
is to be approved in our present economy as non-inflationary, since there
is no credit extended to the assignor without a corresponding sale or pro-
duction on his part. In 1929 only 418 million dollars was involved in
accounts receivable financing.4 By 1941 the amount was estimated to
have reached 2.6 billion dollars,5 and today the figure is approximated at
"In one recent case the State Department denied a passport because the applicant
could not show that he had sufficient funds to go abroad, the applicant having run
short of money while abroad in the past. The court considered the refusal an
abuse of discretion. Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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10 billion dollars a year.6 Obviously, it has become a most favored form
of financing.y
The benefits of such financing are, briefly, that it provides liquid
working capital, whereby the assignor may meet his current obligations
with cash," and permits expansion without the need for any dilution of
the owner's equity, either by issuing additional stock, or encumbering the
assets by obtaining the more traditional loans.
Since it involves a tripartite arrangement, a clarification of terminol-
ogy is desirable. Within the framework of this article the lender will
be referred to as the "Assignee," the borrower as the "Assignor," and the
person from whom the account arose as the "Account-debtor." There are
several types of such financing but the technical distinction between these
forms is -beyond the scope of this particular work.
SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM: WHAT CONSTITUTES AN
ASSIGNABLE ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE
A very important question in this area is what constitutes an account
receivable so as to be validly assignable. Basically there are three types
of accounts; an assignor's claim for money against the account-debtor for
goods or services already delivered, i.e. a present claim under a present
contract; the assignor's claim for money which will probably arise under
an existing contract he has with the account-debtor, i.e. a future claim
under a present contract; and the possible claim by the assignor against
some account-debtor which may arise under a contract not yet in exist-
ence, i.e. a future claim under a future contract. It has been held that if
the assignor had no existing contract at the date of the assignment to the
assignee, he had a mere expectancy, and therefore nothing to assign.9 On
the other hand, courts have stated that while an assignment of an expect-
ancy was inoperative in law, equity would enforce it, if supported by suf-
1 SAUI.NIER & JACOBY, ACcoUNTs RECEIvABLE FINANCING 1, (1943).
2Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Financing, Practical Lawyer, Nov. 1956, p. 52, see
also Silbert, Financing and Factoring Accounts Receivable, Harv. Bus. Rev.; Jan.-
Feb. 1952, p. 40.
'Silbert, supra note 2.
'Id. at 41.
5 SAULNBR & JACOBY, oP. cit. supra note 1 at 15.
'Kupfer, supra note 2, at 50.
"Silbert tells of Sears, Roebuck & Co. borrowing 200 million dollars at one time
on the assignment of accounts; Silbert, supra note 2 at 47.
'Often thereby receiving the additional benefit of a cash discount and the high credit
rating that usually accompanies cash payments.
'In re Nelson's estate, 211 Iowa 239, 233 N.W. 115 (1930); First National Bank
v. Campbell, 193 S.W. 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Annor. 72 A.L.R 856 (1931).
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ficient consideration, fairly made, and not against public policy for some
other reason.10 Ohio's position on the assignment of future choses in
action has been stated in Smith v. Barrick;
One cannot legally give or assign ... a chose in action unless he has
some legal or equitable interest to give or assign.2'
The equitable interest to which they refer arises from a present contract.
While neither argument as to the propriety of the assignment of future
accounts can claim the overwhelming weight of authority, or the weight
of incontrovertible logic, this policy decision is for the legislatures and
the courts, and partially in the control of lending institutions. For our
purpose it is only essential to be aware of the differences.
PR FECnON oF TITLE
I. Its Importance
The question as to when an assignment becomes perfected has re-
ceived much attention in recent years. The assignee's interest, of course,
is to have his security protected. Thus the time at which his tide is tech-
nically perfected is of great importance. This becomes vital upon the
bankruptcy of the assignor, when the assignment is all the assignee has
to protect his loan.' 2 If his lien has become perfected, it is generally
held that the assignee is entitled to retain all the security and recover the
full amount of his advances.13 It has also been pointed out' 4 that if the
assignee takes before the government files a federal tax lien as required
under the Internal Revenue Code,'5 he should take prior to that lien. Al-
though cases are to be found on both sides of that issue, Kupfer in an
"Cook v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1947); Bradley
Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W. 2d 284 (1948); Field v. New
York, 6 N.Y. 179, 57 Am. Dec. 435 (1852); In re Black 138 App. Div. 562, 123
N.Y. Supp. 371 (1910).
' 151 Ohio St. 201, 204, 85 NE.2d 101 (1949). In the related area of assignment
of wages under an employment contract not yet made, see, Rodijkit v. Andrews, 74
Ohio St. 104, 77 N.E. 747 (1906); Dayton Rubber Co. v. Shroyer, 28 Ohio N.P.
(n.s) 47 (1930); Diehl v. Interstate Loan Co., 57 Ohio App. 532, 15 N.E.2d 170
(1937).
"As regards the account-debtor, he will be protected if he pays the assignor, with no
notice of the assignment, or any assignee, before he gets notice of a prior assign-
ment. Firestone Tire Co. v. Central National Bank, 159 Ohio St. 423, 122 N.E.2d
636 (1953).
'Manufacturers Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442 (1935); United States v.
Seaboard Citizens Nat'l. Bank, 206 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1953); In re Macomb Trailer
Coach, 200 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1952); but cf. Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
1
'Kupfer, Accounts Recaivable Financing, Practical Lawyer, Dec. 1956, p. 60.
mInt. Rev. Code of 1954, S 6323 (a).
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excellent artide,16 makes a strong case for the priority of the assignee. It
must be remembered that the method of perfecting title is a matter for
state law,' 7 and that as a general rule, the law of the domicile of the as-
signor governs.' 8 Therefore we should turn our attention to the methods
whereby that mystical entity, tide, is perfected.
II. Methods of Perfecting Title
(a) Common Law
There was no doubt that at common law nothing in addition to a sim-
ple assignment was needed to perfect the assignee's tide as against his as-
signor. It was also widely held that an assignment without notice to the
account-debtor was good against a judgment creditor, attaching creditor
or garnishee of the assignor.' 9 There were diverse rules at the common
law as to the assignee's tide as opposed to that of a subsequent assignee
who first gave notice to the account-debtor. The majority rule, (so-called
"American" or validation rule) held that the date of assignment cdn-
trolled, and the first assignment in point of time prevailed 20 The as-
signor, having divested himself of his tide to the first assignee, had noth-
ing left to assign to the second assignee. Notice to the account-debtor
added nothing to the legal effect of the assignment.2' This rule had a
variant, called the "Massachusetts" rule, which held that the first assignee
in point of time prevailed unless the second assignee had obtained a
judgment or payment, or made a new contract, or had obtained a promis-
sory note or similar instrument from the account-debtor 22 The minority,
or English, rule held that notice to the account-debtor was essential to
priority over the second assignee.23 Ohio has been said to follow the
English rule, but few cases squarely in point are to be found.2 4 However,
"Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Financing, Practical Lawyer, Dec. 1956, pp. 60-62;
citing U.S. TREAS. REG. § 301.6323-1; R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp.
60 (W.D. Tex. 1956); compare, United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S.
1010 (1956); United States v. Security Trust and Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950);
United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cit. 1955).
'In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3rd Cir. 1946).
's Ibid.
:9 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs § 1255 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTS
§ 172 (1932). For a recent statement, see, Smith v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 311, 273
P.2d 835 (1954).
' Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1921).
' R.F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1956).
2RESTATEENT, CONTRACTS § 173 (1932).
'Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828).
A RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 173 (Ohio Ann. 1933); Compare Adae and Co. v.
Moses, 2 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 338, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 419 (1877) with
Gamble v. Carlisle, 3 Ohio N.P. 279, 6 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 48 (1896).
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it is dear that in Ohio the priority of the original assignee's lien does not
depend upon notice.2 5
(b) The Statutes
The greatest problems and confusion arose under the Chandler Act2 6
(Bankruptcy Act) and the cases which interpreted it. Prior to that Act
the assignee's rights were superior to that of the trustee in bankruptcy,
subject to some restrictions.W7 The Chandler Act said that the transfer
was deemed perfected "when no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and
no creditor could get better rights than the transferee had."28 The now-
famous case of Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder2" held the
statute to mean that if the assignment was not perfected as against this
hypothetical bona fide purchaser, although actually made for contem-
porary value, the assignment was considered made for antecedent value
and therefore to have constituted a preference. In that case, Pennsylvania
law was applicable, and Pennsylvania followed the English rule requiring
notice to the account-debtor. Such notice had not been given. In re
Vardamen Shoe Co.30 held that if any possibility that a bona fide pur-
chaser might intervene exists, the assignee's titie was not perfected and
the assignment was voidable as a preference.31 In 1951, the Bankruptcy
Act was amended again32 to remove from section 60a(2) the bona fide
purchaser clause and to make, in its place, the trustee in bankruptcy the
equivalent of a "creditor holding a lien obtainable by legal or equitable
proceeding on a simple contract." While the burden on the assignee was
reduced, the perfection of title remained as important because a transfer
is still deemed made only when it is perfected. Thus it has become cru-
cial to the lending interests that the techniques of perfection of title be
more dearly delineated.
(c) The Effects of the Klauder Case
As a result of this problem, the legislatures of many states passed
statutes which set out a system whereby tide became perfected. The
courts took cognizance of the fact that these statutes were dearly aimed
'Copeland v. Manton, 22 Ohio St. 298 (1872).
052 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1952).
'See, Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 359 (1925).
'See note 26, supra.
318 U.S. 434 (1943).
'52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
tmSee In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3rd Cir. 1946), cert. denied 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
=64 STAT. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1952).
19571
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
at the Chandler Act.3 s These statutes were of three main types: a reen-
actment of the validation rule;84 so-called Book-marking statutes; 5 and
Notice-filing statutes.8 6 Much has been written pro and con on the va-
rious techniques;37 but the greatest objection is the very fact that there
are differences, and even within one of the categories they vary to some
extent in almost every jurisdiction. 8  The ultimate goal should be the
uniform adoption of one technique, but unless the Uniform Commercial
Code becomes much more widely accepted, this goal now seems unob-
tainable:
ADVANTAGES OF THE STATUTORY TECHNIQUES
Book-marking is the least commendable of the three main devices,
and only North Dakota 9 retains this system, Pennsylvania 40 and
Georgia4 1 having abandoned it. In essence, it requires a notation to be
entered on the books of the account-debtor to the effect that the account
has been assigned to the assignee. This obviously is unwieldy and does
oM. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1955); Costello v. Bank of
America, 141 F.Supp. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
"ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 68-805 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6718 to 6726
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121 2 §§ 220-222 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1956); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 19-2101 (Replac. Vol. 1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 113, § 171
(1954); MD. ANN. CODE, art 8, § 2 (1951); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 107A §§ 1 to 6
(1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.841 to .851 (Supp. 1955); MINN. STAT. ANN.
55 521.01 to .07 (1948); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 333:1 to :4 (1955); ORE.
REV. STAT. §5 80.010 to .030 (1954); S.D. CODE § 51.0803 (Supp. 1952); VA.
CODE ANN. § 11-5 (1950); WIS. STAT. § 241.28 (1953) .
ON.D. REv. CODE 5 9-1109 (Supp. 1953).
2ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 39, 55 207 to 214 (Supp. 1955); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 44 § 801 to 808 (1956); CAL. Civ. CODE §5 3017 to -29 (Deering Supp.
1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5§ 11-2-1 to -4 (1953); FLA. STAT. §5 524.01 to
.06 (1955); GA. CODE §§ 85-1806 to -1813 (Supp. 1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 64-901 to -906 (1949); IOWA CODE ANN. 55 539.7 to .15 (Supp. 1956);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-801 to -807 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §5 9:3101
to :3110 (Supp. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §5 410.010 to .060 (1952); NEB. REV.
STAT. 55 69-601 to -621 (Supp. 1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5§ 44-77 to -85 (1950);
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1325.01 to .08; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 631 (Supp.
1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-106 (1954); S.C. CODE § 45-201 to -211
(1952); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1 (Supp. 1956)); UTAH CODE
ANN. 5 9-3-1 to 9-3-6 (1953); Public Acts of Vt., No. 164 (1953); WASHL REv.
CODE 5 63.16.010 (1952).
mKoessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. RaV. 40 (1945);
Koessler, New Legislation, 44 MICH. L. REv. 563 (1945).
' See statutes of Michigan, Iowa and Louisiana for an interesting comparison, supra
notes 34 and 36.
'See note 35, supra.
10PA. STAT. ANN. tir. 69, § 561.
"GA. CODE 5 85-1806 (1955).
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not give the creditors of the assignor any general notice. The validation
(American Rule) statutes 2 have several important advantages. They
are by far the least technical and therefore the most desirable, and they
conform to the rule and procedure of New York,43 our most influential
commercial state. In general, they provide that the assignment is per-
fected when made, usually requiring that it be made in good faith and
for value, and protecting the account-debtor who pays the assignor with-
out notice of the assignment.44
However there is a strong policy objection to secrecy in liens,45 es-
pecially where bankruptcy may be involved, and there is a desire that
these transactions be visible to the public. That desire caused some states
to enact a notice-filing statute46 which set up an agency to preserve a
record of the notice that the assignor was assigning his accounts to the
assignee. Thus, anyone planning to become the assignor's creditor could
check a public record to see whether or not the assignor's accounts receiv-
able were also available to himn4 7 The objections have been that the
assignor must thereby reveal his credit arrangements to the public, that
the statutes are difficult to draw and that new legal problems in them-
selves are created.4 8 The principal benefit of notice-filing is the publicity
feature, and since assigning of accounts is no longer any indication of
weak financial standing,49 the benefits to subsequent creditors and the
hindrance of secret liens far outweigh the objections. Recordation, in
general, has received strong policy support in other areas, i.e., conditional
sales, mortgages, etc. In this area, notice-filing seems the simplest way
to reach a desirable result. Ohio was the first jurisdiction to adopt no-
tice-filing,50 which, significantly, has been included in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.51 While the prognosticators felt that validation would
"See note 34, supra.
'New York, the founder of the validation rule has not enacted it into a statute, pre-
sumably because the common law rule is so well settled. Kupfer, Accounts Receiv-
able Financing, Practical Lawyer, Nov. 1956, p. 61. Notice is required in other
factor liens, see N.Y. PEas. PROP. IAw § 45, but the courts have held that section not
applicable to the assignment of accounts as security, In re Bernard v. Katz, Inc. 38
F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1930).
"See New Hampshire and Wisconsin Statutes for examples, see note 34 supra.
2 WILLIsTON, CONMAACrs § 435(a) (Supp. 1956).
"See note 36, supra.
' "The theory of notice-filing is that the public notice should merely alert the
stranger to need for further credit information about the assignor." Freedheim &
Goldston, Article 9 and Security Interests in Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel
Paper, 14 OMO ST. L.J. 69, 79 (1953).
' Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1945).
"Silbert, supra note 2.
Omo Gn. CODE § 8509-3.
6UIFORM COMMElCIAL CODE § 9-102(1) (b).
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prove more popular,52 notice-filing has now been adopted in the larger
number of states. 58
THE OHIO STATUTE, OHIO REV. CODE §§1325.01-.04
Originally enacted in 1941, reclarified and modified in 195 1,54 and
presently undergoing redarification again,55 the statute in Ohio has been
a landmark. The crucial question under it has yet to be tested. That is,
in point of time, what assignments are protected by the filing of notice?
It has been assumed by respected authorities,56 and the lending interests,
that our statute provided that any assignment made within the three year
period of the effectiveness of the Notice of Assignment became protected
when assigned. There seemed good reason for that position as the form
of the Notice of AssignmentT states that the assignor "hereby assigns or
intends to assign" (italics supplied) and the statute requires filing to be
made "prior to or contemporaneously with" the assignment (italics sup-
plied). 5 Thus it would appear that the notice could dearly precede the
assignment. There is no reason, policy-wise, why this should not be al-
lowed. Although other states may enunciate the procedure more dearly
in their statutes,5 9 there was no indication that this was not the meaning
of our notice provisions.
Two cases have been decided in Texas recently which cast doubt on
the possible interpretation by an Ohio or Federal court of our statute. The
Texas Assignment of Accounts Receivable Statute 0 was sufficiently like
Ohio's to make a comparison logical. Also to be considered is the great
paucity of cases interpreting these statutes. Basically, Texas provided that
the notice was to be effective for a definite period not to exceed three
years."1 It defined an account receivable as "an existing or future right
to the payment of money presently due or to become due (a) under an
' See note 48, supra.
'See note 36, supra.
119 OHIo LAws 850.
124 OHo LAws 141.
'Folkerth, Accounts Receivable Pinancing, 12 OHiO ST. L. J. 333, 334 (1951);
Freedheim and Goldston, supra note 47.
"OHio REv. CODE § 1325.01.
m OHIO REv. § 1325.03.
'See for example FLA. STAT. § 524.04 (1955) "... written assignment for value
signed by the assignor becomes protected at the time the assignee; ... (b) takes an
assignment during the effective period of the notice."
' TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 260-1 (1948), amended art. 260-1 (Supp. 1956).
TEx. Civ. ANN. art 260-1 (4) (1948).
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existing contract.. "2 This was held in Keeran v,. Salley63 to mean that
filing of notice only protects accounts in existence when the notice was
filed. This position was followed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in 1956.64 While the Keeran Case was severely citicised,6 5 it
remained the interpretation of Article 260-1 until the Texas legislature
changed the statute.66
Parenthetically, it might be noted that both the Keeran Case and the
Vial Case could have been decided on different grounds. In the former,
the garnishor had perfected his attachment prior to the assignment, and
therefore should have taken prior to the assignee. In the latter, the as-'
signment was of an expectancy, since there was no existing contract when
the assignment was made; and since such assignments were not included
under the statutory definition of an account in the Texas law, it could
not be protected thereunder.
These courts failed to distinguish between the substantive rule of their
jurisdiction as to what accounts are assignable and the procedural rule on
the effectiveness of notice. If a jurisdiction adopts the rule that future
accounts arising out of future contracts are not assignable, logically that
position has no bearing on the effectiveness of an assignment of a present
account under a notice filed before the existence of the account. The
weakness of many of the accounts receivable statutes is that they fail
to distinguish clearly enough the procedural notice feature from the sub-
stantive rule of the assignability of accounts. In both the Texas and the
Ohio definitions sections,67 the word "existing" appears twice, "existing
right" and "under an existing contract." These sections are not discuss-
ing notice; they are substantive law sections. Clearly they limit assign-
ments to present or future rights under present contracts, and neither per-
mits the assignment of a future right under a future contract.
In two well-reasoned circuit court cases this point is well delineated.
The first case, Second National Bank v. Phillips,68 held that the purpose
of the aforementioned Texas statute was to give all persons dealing with
the assignor a chance to further investigate his financial position; and
where notice was filed, and a continuing credit relation existed, the as-
62Tnx. Rmv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1(1) (1948), see OMHo REV. CODE S
1325.01.
-244 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error refused.
"'Republic Nat'l Bank v. Vial, 232 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956).
"31 Tnx. L REv. 65 (1952).
6T7). RaV. CIw. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1 (Supp. 1956).
TEx. Rm. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 260-1(1) (1948); OHIo REV. CODE § 1325.01-
(A).
6189 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951).
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signee had a lien upon the accounts assigned under that notice. The later
case, United States v. Phillips,6 9 overruled a trial court70 which had held
the assignee's lien prior to a federal tax lien which had been filed between
the filing of notice by the assignee and the actual assignment of the ac-
count. While the court in this case mentions that the Bank Case was de-
cided before the court in the Keeran Case had interpreted the applicable
Texas statute, its holding is not inconsistent with the Bank Case. It can
be conceded that a lien filed prior to the actual assignment may take
precedence "The time of the government's filing is the crucial point. 71
Thus the United States Case does not rest on the position that because the
account was not in existence when the notice was filed the assignee's
claim is defeated, but rather, it was because it became perfected after the
government had perfected its lien.7 2
An important object of notice-filing is to avoid overly encumbering
the financial world with burdensome technicalities. Once constructive
notice has been given, through filing, that the assignee is taking the as-
signor's accounts, what more need be required? Is there any reason to
require new notice with each assignment? The Uniform Commercial
Code specifically praises notice-filing for,
Obviating the necessity of refiing on each of a series of transactions in
a continuing arrangement where the colateral changes from day to day.
The criticism of the Keerat; Case expresses the opinion that the case does
not conform with business custom or legislative intent,%74 which latter
comment was born out by the legislature's prompt amendment of Article
260-1.75
The Ohio Legislature has acted to clarify the Accounts Receivable
Act for the future by including in § 1325.01 (the definition section)
words to the effect that an account is a right to immediate or future
payment existing at the time of the assignment thereof (italics supplied)
and a right to payment which may arise under a contract existing at the
time of the assginment of sach right.76 The statute also adds to § 1325.04
(the notice section) words showing that neither the contract nor the ac-
e198 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1952).
10sub. -nom. In re Cumings, 99 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Tex. 1951).
71Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Fimnning, PRAcrlcAL. LAWYER, Dec. 1956, p. 60.
"Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943); Detroit Bank v. United States,
317 U.S. 329 (1943).
UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 9-402 (2).
"See note 65, supra.
'See note 66, supra.
" A. S. B. 235, effective date Sept. 7, 1957, see GONGwER's ST. Rip. (Ohio), June
4, 1957.
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